Ancient Banking, Modern Crimes: How Hawala Secretly Transfers the Finances of Criminals and Thwarts Existing Laws by Wheatley, Joseph
ANCIENT BANKING, MODERN CRIMES:
HOW HAWALA SECRETLY TRANSFERS THE FINANCES OF
CRIMINALS AND THWARTS EXISTING LAWS
JOSEPH WHEATLEY*
1. INTRODUCTION
Hawala, an ancient banking system that originated in the Mid-
dle East and South Asia, has spread around the world. Secretive
by nature, hawala remains a mystery to most people outside of the
ethnic communities that use it. It is fast, inexpensive, reliable, con-
venient, and, most notably, discreet. These qualities have earned
hawala many legitimate customers, not to mention money laun-
derers and terrorist financiers.
Since its transactions leave little or no trace, hawala bedevils fi-
nancial auditors and law enforcement officials. It also poses con-
siderable challenges to existing legal and regulatory regimes on
money laundering and terrorist financing. These regimes rely
upon factors that hawala usually lacks, namely detailed records,
registration with the government, and connections to mainstream
banking. Accordingly, some law enforcement efforts against ha-
wala will fall short. Even so, there are opportunities for govern-
ments to exploit hawala's minimal connections with mainstream
financial institutions and to promote alternative remittance sys-
tems that are subject to oversight.
Section 2 of this paper examines the hawala system, particu-
larly how it operates and the reasons for its enduring popularity.
Section 3 analyzes the role of hawala in money laundering and ter-
rorist financing crimes. Section 4 outlines and criticizes the legal
and regulatory regimes of the United States and elsewhere that
target hawala and its related criminal activity. Section 5 presents
strategies for curtailing the illegal use of hawala. Section 6 summa-
rizes the article, and concludes with remarks about the challenges
posed to law enforcement authorities by hawala.
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2. WHAT IS HAWALA?
Hawala serves as an alternative remittance system. It is one of
the "financial services, traditionally operating outside the
conventional financial sector, where value or funds are moved
from one geographic location to another."' That mundane defini-
tion obscures an ancient and mysterious system which functions
apart from, or parallel to, the banking and financial systems that
exist in the developed world.2 In fact, hawala transfers money
without actually moving it. Some of the other alternative remit-
tance systems are hundi,3 fai chen,4 and the black market peso
1 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, COMBATING THE
ABUSE OF ALTERNATIVE REMITrANCE SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES 1
(June 20, 2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/32/15/
34255005.pdf.
2 See PATRICK M. JOST & HARjIT SINGH SANDHU, INTERPOL, THE HAWALA
ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE IN MONEY LAUNDERING Uan. 2000),
at http:/ /www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/
default.asp (describing alternative remittance systems).
3 Hundi is essentially the same system as hawala. The term hundi is some-
times used in Pakistan whereas hawala is used in India. Patrick Jost and Harjit
Sandhu note that:
The word hundi comes from the Sanskrit root meaning "collect." In In-
dia, one of its most common meanings is for the collection box found in a
Hindu temple. In addition to this, it also has the same meanings as ha-
wala: bill of exchange, promissory note, trust, reference and the alterna-
tive remittance system.
Id. app. A.
L.C. Jain defines hundi as "a written order-usually conditional -made by
one person on another for the payment, on demand or after a specified time, of a
certain sum of money to a person named therein." L.C. JAIN, INDIGENOUS
BANKING IN INDIA 71 (1929).
4 The general principles of hawala originated in China during the Teng
(T'ang) Dynasty. Growth in the tea trade between the south and the capital made
it necessary to develop a more convenient exchange method. The method which
emerged was called "fai chen," meaning "flying money." Courts received pay-
ments from southern tea merchants. The courts then issued certificates to the
merchants. Upon arriving home, the merchant could redeem the certificate for
payment. Thanks to this system of "flying money," neither the government
agents nor the merchants had to travel long distances with money in their posses-
sion. Alan Lambert, Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism, 15 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 9, 13 (2002). The T'ang Dynasty lasted from 618-907 A.D. Encyclopedia
Britannica Online, Tang Dynasty, at http://www.britannica.com/ebc/arti-
cle?tocId=9380219 (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). In China, this hawala-type system is
also called "chop" or "chit." See JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2 (describing the
Chinese system).
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exchange.5
2.1. An Example of a Hawala Transaction
Consider the following scenario, tailored to reflect the ethnic
communities (and their needs) that tend to use hawala.6 Fareed, a
Pakistani man working in Los Angeles, would like to send $1,000
of his savings to his extended family in Islamabad. The bank re-
quires that he open an account first. It will charge him for rupees
at the official exchange rate. Courier services, more reliable than
surface mail, cost extra. The process might be completed within a
week.
Frustrated by the cost and hassle of this proposed transaction,
Fareed approaches Khalid, a member of the local Pakistani com-
munity. Khalid owns a jewelry store, but on the side he works as a
hawaladar, or hawala broker. He charges a modest two percent
commission and uses a more favorable exchange rate than the
bank. Delivery is free.
5 The U.S. Customs Services describes the black market peso exchange as "a
complex system currently used by the Colombian cartels to launder billions of
dollars of drug money each year." In particular, "[t]he peso broker uses contacts
in the United States to place the drug dollars he purchased from the cartel into the
U.S. banking system. The peso broker, still operating in Colombia, now has a pool
of narcotics-derived funds in the U.S. to 'sell' to legitimate Colombian importers."
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, BLACK MARKET PESO EXCHANGE: A TRADE BASED MONEY
LAUNDERING SYSTEM (June 1999), available at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/
ImageCache/cgov/content/publications/pesos_2epdf/vl/pesos.pdf.
6 The hawala transaction example was adapted from the following sources:
Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms: Hearing Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin., 107th Cong. 45-49 (2001) [hereinafter Hawala tes-
timony] (statement of Patrick Jost, SRA International); LISA C. CARROLL, INTERPOL,
ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEMS DISTINGUISHING SUB-SYSTEMS OF ETHNIC MONEY
LAUNDERING IN INTERPOL MEMBER COUNTRIES ON THE ASIAN CONTINENT (2000),
available at http://www.interpol.com/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering
/EthnicMoney/default.asp; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY
LAUNDERING, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 2002-2003, at 7 (2003),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/29/33/ 34037958.pdf; U.S. GEN.
Acc. OFF., No. GAO-04-163, TERRORIST FINANCING: U.S. AGENCIES SHOULD
SYSTEMATICALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS' USE OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS
18 (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf;
CHRISTINE HOWLETT, INVESTIGATION & CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING VIA
ALTERNATIVE REMITrANCE & UNDERGROUND BANKING SYSTEMS 5 (Apr. 2001), avail-
able at http://www.churchilltrust.com.au/Fellows%20Reports/Howlett%20
Christine%202000.pdf; Mian Ahad Hayaud-Din, The Hawallah Network: Culture and
Economic Development in Afghanistan, 78 INT'L SOC. SCI. REV. 21, 21 (2003); JOST &
SANDHU, supra note 2; Michelle Cottle, Eastern Union, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 2001,
at 24.
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Fareed chooses to do business with Khalid instead of the bank.
He gives Khalid the $1,000. Using e-mail, Khalid contacts Nawaz,
a fellow jeweler and hawaladar that he knows in Islamabad.
Fareed's family then provides a prearranged password to Nawaz,
who gives them the converted rupees (minus the commission).
The whole process is complete within a day.
In this isolated transaction, no money actually traveled be-
tween the United States and Pakistan. Instead, one hawaladar,
Nawaz, entered into debt on behalf of another, Khalid, using funds
that were already in Pakistan. Fareed's transaction is just one of
many in the multilayered community of hawaladars that spans the
globe, knit together by social connections and trust. In the absence
of trust, the system would collapse and financial systems based on
other principles would fill the void. Nawaz, for instance, must
trust that Khalid will settle his debt one day, assuming that Nawaz
did not already owe Khalid for some previous debt. By providing
funds to Fareed's family (and others) on behalf of Khalid, Nawaz
might be settling his debt to him. In this case, hawala serves as a
one-sided transaction, gradually eroding one hawaladar's debt to
another.
Another plausible scenario is that Khalid and Nawaz are en-
gaged in an ongoing business relationship, so hawala debt, along
with other debts, will shift back and forth over time. This tends to
require a more formal process of account balancing using conven-
tional bank transfers, gold and precious gem smuggling, and
printed currency shipments.7 Invoice manipulation (a customs vio-
lation8) could also obscure hawala transfers. 9 Khalid could settle
his debt from Fareed's transaction by "underinvoicing" a shipment
7 See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 2002-2003, supra note 6, at 19-24 (reporting on
methods of money laundering); FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY
LAUNDERING, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 1999-2000, at 6 (Feb. 3,
2000) (describing the balancing of accounts between hawala brokers), available at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/TY2000_en.pdf; SAMUEL MUNZELE MAIMBO, THE
MONEY EXCHANGE DEALERS OF KABUL: A STUDY OF THE HAWALA SYSTEM IN
AFGHANISTAN 12 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 13, 2003) (discussing the usage
of bank transfers by hawaladars), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/16/000090341 20031016085357/
Rendered/PDF/ 269720PAPEROMoney0exchange0dealers.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2005).
8 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2000).
9 See United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing ha-
wala's role in an invoice manipulation scheme).
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of jewelry to Nawaz. For instance, Khalid could send Nawaz
$3,000 worth of jewelry but only charge him $2,000. The $1,000 dif-
ference in price would settle Khalid's hawala debt to Nawaz. The
process also works in reverse. "Overinvoicing" could be used to
send money to the United States. For instance, Khalid could send
Nawaz $2,000 worth of jewelry but charge him $3,000. When
Nawaz pays for the merchandise, $1,000 enters the United States
covertly.
Due to its flexible nature, hawala can accommodate multiple
parties, and is only limited by the social connections that sustain it.
Indeed, more than two hawaladars may work together at any
given time, transferring debt amongst themselves. For instance,
Nawaz may owe money to a third hawaladar. Khalid could settle
his debt to Nawaz by paying the third hawaladar directly. Though
the hawala system can accommodate complex relationships such
as this, it rests upon basic principles of debt assignment. From the
perspective of the individual customer, such as Fareed, hawala
transfers money without actually moving it.
2.2. A Portrait of a Hawaladar
When questioned by outsiders, hawaladars sometimes disavow
their profession or refuse to discuss it.10 As a result, piercing the
veil of secrecy around hawala has presented a challenge for law en-
forcement."
However, consider this insider's account of the hawala system.
A hawaladar, Rahim Bariek, testified about his business before the
U.S. Senate's Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance in
2001.12 His testimony shed light on the hawala system. Bariek's
hawala business, run as a second job, served between 200 and 300
customers in Northern Virginia near Washington, D.C. His cus-
tomers made monthly transfers to Pakistan worth between $20 and
$400. Family members typically relied on these funds as supple-
mental income for housing and food expenses. Bariek also proc-
essed larger hawala transfers, valued between $1,000 and $5,000
for occasions such as weddings and funerals. His business terms
10 See Cottle, supra note 6 (describing the reluctance of hawala brokers to dis-
cuss their profession with the public).
11 See id. (discussing U.S. problems with hawala infiltration).
12 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 42 (statement of Rahim Bariek, Bariek
Money Transfer). For more profiles of hawaladars, see MAIMBO, supra note 7, at
20051
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resembled those of other hawaladars. He charged a five percent
commission, delivered within twenty-four hours, and required a
password or identification to finalize the transaction.
Significantly, Bariek only transferred funds on behalf of fami-
lies that he knew personally. He regarded hawala as a humanitar-
ian enterprise: "The money I receive in the United States never
goes directly to Pakistan. But it does get to the families in Pakistan
[that] need it."13 He had no qualms about complying with banking
laws.
2.3. Enduring Popularity from Antiquity to the Present
The hawala system, which likely predates the Western banking
system, originated in the Middle East and South Asia during an-
cient times.14 It means "change" and "transform" in Arabic.'5
When the Hindi language incorporated the word, it also began to
connote "trust," a principal quality of hawala to this day.16 The
system gained favor among Arab traders who used it to spare
themselves the inconvenience of carrying large amounts of money,
and to limit the risk of robbery on the Silk Road.' 7 Religion has
also played a role in the popularity of hawala. Muslims have an
obligation to give alms to the needy, and hawala helps transmit
these funds on their behalf.18
Hawala is still widely used in South Asia and the Middle
East.19 For instance, hawala brokers in Pakistan, India, and the
United Arab Emirates ("UAE") have large customer bases. Indeed,
a city-state of the UAE, Dubai, serves as one of the world's clear-
13 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 43 (statement of Rahim Bariek, Bariek
Money Transfer).
14 Lambert, supra note 4, at 12.
15 JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2, app. A.
16 Id. There are other meanings of the word. In Urdu, it means "reference."
Alan Lambert also provided a "non-Arabic Muslim phrase" in which it means
"transfer of money between two persons through a third person." Lambert, supra
note 4, at 13.
17 Douglas Frantz, Ancient Secret System Moves Money Globally, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2001, at B5; Lambert, supra note 4, at 13.
18 See S.A. ALl, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE ISLAM OF MOHAMMED
87-89 (1993) (describing the Islamic view on greed and charity).
19 See JOST & SANDHu, supra note 2 (describing how hawala is still used
around the world); NIKos PASSAS, INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS: A STUDY INTO SO-CALLED UNDERGROUND BANKING
NETWORKS (1999), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/img/assets/4756
/ivts.pdf (describing the prevalence of hawala).
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inghouses for hawala transactions.20 In the United States and else-
where, immigrant communities from those regions have brought
their preference for hawala with them.2'
Due to the secretive nature of hawala, few statistics exist about
its use. Using the latest figures available, Interpol, an international
police organization, estimated that in 1998, the amount of money
in India's hawala system (which is illegal22) totaled $680 billion.23
That amounts to 40% of the country's Gross Domestic Product, but
estimates have ranged as high as 50%.24 In Pakistan, where it is
also illegal, 25 hawala has supposedly represented the country's
largest source of hard currency, an estimated $5 billion per year,26
though recent estimates have also ranged from $2 billion to $3 bil-
lion per year. 27 Individual transactions have reached as high as $10
million.28
Contemporary hawala grew as a modem financial system due
to a number of complex sociopolitical and economic factors. First,
the 1970s ushered in an era of oil wealth for the Middle East, and
many Islamic banks emerged.29 Second, some of hawala's growth
20 See JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2 (explaining the role of the UAE in hawala
networks). Great Britain and Switzerland are other major hawala financial cen-
ters.
21 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Tarik M. Yousef, Profes-
sor, Georgetown University).
22 See FINANCIAL AcTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 1999-2000, supra note 7 (stating that the use of
hawala is illegal in India); Scott Baldauf, The War on Terror's Money, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONrrOR, July 22, 2002, at 1 (describing hawala as a major violation of Indian for-
eign exchange laws); JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2 ("It is, however, possible to state
'hawala is illegal in India and Pakistan' with nearly complete accuracy.").
23 See Baldauf, supra note 22 (giving financial figures on hawala traffic).
24 Id.; FINANCIAL ACrION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING 1999-2000, supra note 7 (reporting fi-
nancial figures on hawala traffic).
25 See JosT & SANDHU, supra note 2 (explaining the legal status of hawala in
Pakistan).
26 Robert Looney, Hawala: The Terrorist's Informal Financial Mechanism, MIDDLE
E. POL'Y, Spring 2003, at 164, 166.
27 Fasih Ahmed, Antiterror Measure Helps Pakistan, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 21,
2003, at A3.
28 See, e.g., Matt Miller, Underground Banking: An Illegal Money Transfer Net-
work Keeps Business Moving in Troubled Asian Economies, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Jan. 1999, at 32, 33 (1999) (reporting a hawala dealer's story that he witnessed a
$10 million transfer).
29 Lambert, supra note 4, at 14.
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may be attributed to gold smuggling that took place between the
Middle East and South Asia in the 1960s.30 At the time, Indian and
Pakistani expatriates working in the Middle East needed a system
to transmit funds back home to their families.31 Essentially, the ex-
patriates "paid" for the gold sold in South Asia by sending their
wages via hawala.32 As David Nissman explains it, "[t]he South
Asians who held the proceeds for the gold sales then gave the
money to the families of the wage earners while keeping their
share of the profits from the gold smuggling."33
Third, financial systems in the developing world only began to
modernize after World War II and government intervention has
encumbered the modernization process.34 Professor Tarik Yousef
attributes this to "repressive financial policies, excessive taxation,
foreign exchange and trade restrictions and a banking system that
is driven by the needs of the governments." 35 As a result, the
Western-style financial system has not gained much traction in the
Middle East. Given these economic conditions, cash has remained
the preferred financial medium for many people in the Middle
East.36
Lacking viable alternatives, people have relied upon hawala,
not mainstream banking, to transfer their cash.37 In the developing
world, hawala possesses qualities that wire transfers lack. First,
hawala transfers cost much less than conventional wire transfers.38
Western Union charges $22 to transfer $200 from Karachi, Pakistan
to New York City.39 In comparison, a competing hawaladar
charges a mere ten dollars.40 Hawala commission rates also tend to
be modest, orie or two percent for a transaction in Afghanistan, for
30 David Marshall Nissman, Hawala, U.S. ATF'Ys' BULL., May 2002, at 13, 17,
available at http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/ usab5003.
pdf.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Tarik M. Yousef, Profes-
sor, Georgetown University).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Ahmed, supra note 27.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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Second, hawala transfers take place quickly. Modem-day
technologies such as telephones, e-mail, and faxes tie the hawal-
adar community together.42 Some hawaladars advertise that they
can complete a transfer in two hours, but most do so within two
days.43 For instance, transfers to Kabul from Dubai or London take
six to twelve hours.44 In comparison, a conventional wire transfer
might require a week.
45
Third, the trust element of hawala has made the system very
reliable.46 In comparison, wire transfers are occasionally lost or
stolen in transit.47 International aid organizations have relied upon
hawala to deliver funds to the needy in Afghanistan, and they have
expressed general satisfaction with the remittance services pro-
vided.48
Fourth, hawala is sometimes the only way for poor people or
people in remote areas to send and receive funds.49 In comparison,
financial institutions in the developing world gravitate around
large cities and cater to governments and the wealthy.
50
Fifth, hawala requires less bureaucracy. 51 For instance, a bank
would require formal identification, such as a social security num-
41 See MAIMBO, supra note 7, at 27 (providing examples of the commissions
charged by hawala brokers).
42 Mohammed EI-Qorchi, Hawala: How Does This Informal Funds Transfer Sys-
tem Work, and Should It Be Regulated?, FiN. & DEV., Dec. 2002, at 31, 32.
43 See JosT & SANDHU, supra note 2 (stating that a hawala remittance takes
place within two days); Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of Patrick
Jost, SRA International) (stating that hawala transfers usually take place in
twenty-four hours).
44 MAImBO, supra note 7, at 5.
45 JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2.
46 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of Patrick Jost, SRA Interna-
tional). Jost notes that "[h]awaladars form an extended community, and it is rare
for them to defraud one another or their clients. In the rare cases where this has
happened, other Hawaladars are known to make good on the debts of their col-
league." Id.
47 See, e.g., JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2 (describing how an international wire
transfer was lost in transit); Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 42 (statement of Ra-
him Bariek, Bariek Money Transfer) (recounting a personal incident of a lost
money transfer to Pakistan through a conventional bank).
48 MAiMsO, supra note 7, at 11.
49 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Tarik M. Yousef, Profes-
sor, Georgetown University).
50 Id.
51 JosT & SANDHU, supra note 2.
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ber, to initiate the transfer process, whereas hawala relies upon
personal relationships and connections. 2 This appeals to people
who lack formal identification or wish to conceal their immigration
status, for instance. 53
Sixth, hawala does not create a detailed paper trail, if it yields a
paper trail at all.54 This quality makes hawala an attractive me-
dium for illicit transactions, such as terrorist financing55 and the
evasion of taxes, 5 6 exchange controls, 57 and import/export duties.58
In comparison, banks and other financial institutions maintain ex-
haustive records, which facilitate investigations. The anonymity of
hawala, and its allure for criminal elements, will figure promi-
nently in this Comment.
3. HAWALA'S ROLE IN MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
FINANCING
As discussed above, hawala's many qualities have attracted a
large following of customers. The vast majority of their transac-
tions are legitimate, but a small percentage of them facilitate illicit
activity. Hawala itself may be illegal in certain countries, such as
India and Pakistan, but this Comment concerns itself with hawala's
role in other offenses. Criminals value hawala's reliability, speed,
and low cost, not to mention its relative anonymity. The limited
paper trail that it creates allows criminals to transfer funds be-
tween, or within, countries discreetly. By taking advantage of this
anonymity, they may launder funds derived from criminal acts or
channel funds in support of criminal acts.
First, hawala may be used to launder funds derived from
52 Id.
53 Id. Jost and Sandhu cite the example of a person in the United States
whose student visa has expired.
54 See MAIMBO, supra note 7, at 12 (describing the limited paper trail of ha-
wala). For an example of the limited paper trail created by hawala transactions,
see SANJAY KAPOOR, BAD MONEY, BAD POLITIcS: THE UNTOLD HAWALA STORY (1996).
55 See Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 41 (statement of John Varrone, Assis-
tant Commissioner, Office of Investigations, U.S. Customs Service) (discussing the
link between hawala and terrorism); JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2 (expounding on
the role of hawala in terrorist financing).
56 See WORLD BANK, INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS IN THE APEC REGION:
INITIAL FINDINGS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 9 (2003) (describing the
role of hawala in tax evasion).
57 EI-Qorchi, supra note 42, at 33.
58 HOWLETr, supra note 6, at 6.
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criminal acts. These offenses run the gamut: narcotics trafficking,
smuggling, and customs or tax violations, to name a few.59 Hawala
facilitates money laundering in three stages: by discreetly intro-
ducing criminals' funds into the financial system ("placement");
manipulating them to appear legitimate ("layering"); and making
them available for further use ("integration").60 At each stage of
the process, hawala erodes the dirty money trail, especially if the
transactions cross borders. By the time the funds have shifted be-
tween multiple parties in multiple countries, leaving a minimal
paper trail (if that), the dirty money appears clean.
Second, hawala may be used to channel funds in support of
criminal acts. Terrorist groups notably have relied upon it to allo-
cate funds, whether clean or dirty, for organizational and opera-
tional expenses. 61 As it does for money laundering, hawala effec-
tively limits the paper trail that these transfers would otherwise
create in a conventional banking system. In this case, not only are
the funds themselves an issue; so is the legality of the conduct that
they support. Jeff Breinholt, of the U.S. Department of Justice, dis-
tinguished terrorist financing from conventional money launder-
ing, referring to the former as "reverse money laundering" and
"money soilage."62 In such situations, money becomes "dirty by
virtue of its application and use." 63
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
("FATF"), a subsidiary of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development ("OECD"), provided an example of ha-
wala's use in terrorist financing:
A recent successful money laundering investigation con-
cerning a bureau de change operation uncovered evidence
of the laundering of terrorist funds, derived from interna-
tional smuggling. Certain similarities existed with the ha-
59 See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 1999-2000, supra note 7 (illustrating the role of
hawala in criminal activity).
60 See P. Jayaseelapandian, Understanding Money Laundering, HINDU, Oct. 17,
2000 (outlining the process of laundering money); JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2
(describing the role of hawala in money laundering).
61 See Nissman, supra note 30, at 16-17 (describing the role of hawala in ter-
rorist financing).
62 Jeff Breinholt, Terrorist Financing, 51 U.S. ATr'ys' BuLL., No. 4, July 2003, at
63Id.
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wala system in that there were substantial cash payments
into the bureau de change which were not reflected in its
principal books and records nor were they reflected in the
bureau de change's bank account. The bureau de change
held a huge cash reserve which was drawn upon, when
necessary by members of the terrorist organisation. In ad-
dition, the bureau de change would remit payments from
its legitimate bank account to entities in other jurisdictions,
on behalf of the terrorist organisation, which upon investi-
gation was shown to be payment for contraband.64
As for al Qaeda, investigators have established that hawala
transactions did not supply the financing for the September 11th
attacks. 65 Currency importation and conventional banking trans-
fers likely supplied the funds.66 However, al Qaeda used hawala to
remove its funds from Afghanistan as U.S.-led forces swept
through the country in 2001.67 It also used hawala to help finance
the American Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.68
Al Qaeda continues to use the hawala system to transfer its funds
around the globe,69 as do other terrorist groups.70
Hawala offers speed, low cost, reliability, and relative anonym-
ity. These qualities appeal to legitimate and illegitimate customers
64 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON MONEY
LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 2002-2003, supra note 6, at 9.
65 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION (2004), at
139-40 (revealing that no hawala or other informal transfer mechanisms were used
to send money to the United States), available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/staff statements/911_TerrFinMonograph.pdf.
66 Id, at 131-144; The PATRIOT Act Oversight: Investigating Patterns of Terrorist
Financing: Hearing Before the U.S. House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
107th Cong. 9-11 (2002) (statement of Dennis Lormel, Chief, Financial Crimes Sec-
tion, Criminal Investigations Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available
at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/021202dl.pdf.
67 See Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda's Road Paved With Gold, WASH. POST, Feb. 17,
2002, at Al (exploring the role of hawala in al Qaeda's finances).
68 See Timothy O'Brien, U.S. Focusing on Dubai as a Terrorist Financial Center,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at 13 (addressing the role of hawala in the 1998 U.S. Em-
bassy bombings).
69 Id.
70 See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 2002-2003 supra note 6, at 8-9 (describing the role
of hawala in terrorist financing).
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alike. Money launderers and terrorist financiers have used hawala,
and will continue to use it as long as it remains available to them
and meets their needs.
4. CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY REGIMES
The money laundering and terrorist financing schemes de-
scribed above run afoul of the laws and regulations of many coun-
tries, including the United States. However, these prohibitions
tend to focus on the bureaucratic financial system, which maintains
detailed records of its transactions. Hawala, in contrast, generates
a limited paper trail, if that. As a result, many transactions con-
ducted via hawala elude detection and investigation by law en-
forcement.
Below is a sample of the laws and regulations that countries
use to address money laundering and terrorist financing, some of
which focus on hawala specifically. In each case, the laws and
regulations rely upon connections to mainstream financial institu-
tions, government licensing, and detailed records, which hawala
often eschews, to perform effectively.
4.1. The United States
The United States has established a legal regime and an inves-
tigative infrastructure to regulate hawala, as well as other systems
of financial transfers. As for the legal regime, Title III of The Unit-
ing and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT")
Act of 200171 addresses money laundering and terrorism financing.
The Act amended the Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") 72 to treat "informal
money transfer system[s]," such as hawala, as financial institu-
tions. 73 The recordkeeping rules that apply to licensed money
transmitters also apply to informal systems. In particular, these
"informal money transfer system[s]" must register as "money
71 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272400 (2001).
72 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12, 15, and 31 U.S.C.)
73 USA PATRIOT Act § 359, 115 Stat. at 328-29. For additional information
on the Bank Secrecy Act, see FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, BANK
SECRECY ACT REQUIREMENTS, available at http://www.msb.gov/pdf/bsa-
quickrefguide.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
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transmitting businesses." 74 Also, the USA PATRIOT Act criminal-
izes the knowing transfer of funds that are derived from crimes or
are to be used in crimes. 75
Under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, hawala is
subject to money laundering regulations, namely the obligation of
hawaladars to file Suspicious Activity Reports ("SAR"). On De-
cember 21, 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") notified certain "money ser-
vices businesses" ("MSB"), namely "money transmitters, and issu-
ers, sellers, and redeemers of money orders and traveler's checks,"
that an administrative rule to report suspicious transactions would
take effect on January 1, 2002.76 An MSB must file the report no
later than thirty calendar days from the date that it detected suspi-
cious activity. 77
Using such laws and regulations, U.S. investigative authorities
have had some success in registering hawala businesses. As of the
release of the 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, "well over
14,000 MSBs" had registered with FinCEN since the deadline of
December 31, 2001.78
74 Id. Money services businesses ("MSB") were also required to register with
the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("Fin-
CEN") by December 31, 2001. In testimony before the U.S. Senate's Subcommittee
on International Trade and Finance in 2001, John Sloan, Director of FinCEN,
stated that 160,000 to 200,000 entities would be affected by the registration re-
quirements. Eight thousand of these were considered principal transmitters, such
as American Express and the United States Postal Service. See Hawala testimony,
supra note 6, at 16 (statement of John Sloan, Director, Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network).
Many of the states in the United States impose similar requirements upon
money transmitters. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1789.30-1789.37 (Deering 2005)
(requiring a permit to operate a check cashiers business); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 641
(McKinney 2004) (requiring a license for any business selling or issuing checks or
engaging in the transmission of money); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-371 (Michie 2004)
(imposing licensing requirements for businesses engaged in money transmis-
sions).
75 USA PATRIOT Act § 373, 115 Stat. at 274.
76 Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Re: Effective Date
for the Suspicious Activity Reporting Requirement for Money Services Businesses
Remains January 1, 2002 (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.fincen.gov/
sardatemsbs.html.
77 Id.
78 U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2003 NATIONAL MONEY
LAUNDERING STRATEGY 14 (2003), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/reports/js10102.pdf. As of September 2002, "well over 10,000" MSB's
had registered with the government. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
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The U.S. government has raided numerous illegal money-
transmitting businesses, some of which are hawala businesses, but
comprehensive data on the raids is unavailable. For instance, from
October 2001 until May 2004, federal agents raided seventeen
money-transmitting businesses in the Washington, D.C. metro
area.79 These businesses allegedly operated without licenses.80
Three of them were suspected by law enforcement authorities of
sending funds to state sponsors of terrorism, but no charges had
been filed as of May 2004.81 Since the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act, U.S. authorities have arrested more than eighty peo-
ple for illegally transferring funds to countries such as Iraq and
Pakistan.82
The government's investigation of Al Barakaat, while techni-
cally not a hawala investigation, illustrates the challenges facing
law enforcement authorities as they try to pierce the veil of hawala.
Al Barakaat was a large money-transfer business that was alleg-
edly used to transfer terrorist financing. It differentiated itself
from the "pure" form hawala by using the mainstream financial
system to transfer value between the sender and the recipient.83 As
such, it was not a hawala broker in the technical sense. Nonethe-
less, Al Barakaat shared some qualities with hawala, namely inter-
national transfers and the large settling transactions that take place
between hawala brokers.84 Accordingly, Al Barakaat sheds light
on the challenges facing the U.S. government as it attempts to in-
vestigate hawala brokers.
On November 7, 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the
assets of Al Barakaat.85 Operation Green Quest is a multiagency
task force led by the U.S. Customs Service that also includes the In-
CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY TO THE FINANCIAL WAR
ON TERRORISM: FACT SHEET 16 (2002), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/reports/2002910184556291211 .pdf.
79 See Mary Beth Sheridan, U.S. Raids 17 Businesses That Send Cash Abroad,
WASH. POST, May 18, 2004, at B1 (discussing raids on money transmitting busi-
nesses without licenses that sent millions of dollars abroad).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 65, at 68 (contrasting Al Barakaat and hawala).
84 Id.
85 Press Release, The White House, President Announces Crackdown on Ter-
rorist Financial Network (Nov. 7, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/11/20011107-4.html.
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ternal Revenue Service, the Secret Service, Treasury's Office of For-
eign Asset Control, and FinCEN. It launched a "coordinated en-
forcement action" against Al Barakaat, raiding offices in six cities:
Boston, MA; Falls Church, VA; Alexandria, VA; Columbus, OH;
Minneapolis, MN; and Seattle, WA.86 The government closed eight
Al Barakaat businesses and subsequently raided other firms affili-
ated with it.87
Al Barakaat emerged in 1989 and ultimately spanned forty
countries. 88 The firm operated 60 offices in Somalia and 127 offices
in other countries. 89 It utilized modern technology to offer wire
transfer services, as well as telecommunications and currency ex-
change services.90 U.S. investigators suspected that Al Barakaat's
founder, a reputed associate of Osama bin Laden, used this infra-
structure to transfer funds and information to terrorist cells.9' The
firm piqued the interests of investigators after Al-Itihaad, an
Islamist group in Somalia, was placed on a list of groups with fro-
zen assets.92
Senior officials of Al Barakaat denied wrongdoing.93 In part,
the firm legitimately served Somalis in the United States, who used
it to transfer funds to relatives in their homeland.94 The raids
placed Somali remittances in jeopardy, a troubling scenario since
the country relies upon remittances for a large part of its income.95
Ultimately, U.S. authorities never found direct evidence linking
Al Barakaat with terrorism.96 Criminal charges were never filed
86 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 7 (2001) (statement of John Varrone, As-
sistant Commissioner, Office of Investigations, U.S. Customs Service).
87 Id.
88 Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money Laun-
dering Regimes, 34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 45, 69 (2002).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Edward Alden & Mark Turner, Assets Frozen as U.S. Targets Al-Qaeda Fi-
nancing, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, 2001 WLNR 5710877.
93 Mark Turner, Barakat Pleads Innocent to U.S. 'Terror' Claim, FIN. TIMEs, Nov.
12, 2001, at 6; Tim Golden, 5 Months After Sanctions Against Somali Company, Scant
Proof of Qaeda Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2002, at A10.
94 Nissman, supra note 30, at 18.
95 Mark Turner, Barakat Telecoms Gateway Cut Off, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at
15.
96 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 65, at 80.
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against Al Barakaat in the United States.97 U.S.-based Al Barakaat
brokers filed a suit challenging the seizure of their funds, much of
which was unfrozen and returned.98
The Al Barakaat case illustrated the challenges facing the U.S
authorities as they attempt to penetrate and investigate a money-
transmitting business, which can elude detection more readily than
a conventional financial institution. However, illegal hawala op-
erations pose even greater challenges to law enforcement than
those posed by Al Barakaat. As such, the Al Barakaat case is not an
investigative model that U.S. authorities will be able to follow, or
should follow, consistently.
Al Barakaat, thanks to its size, cast a large shadow. Moreover,
it interacted with conventional financial institutions to transact
business. According to U.S. Attorney David Nissman, since the
"[Al Barakaat] network used financial institutions, law enforce-
ment was able to discover the transactions through the generation
of [SARs] produced by the banks pursuant to their obligations un-
der the [BSA]." 99
However, hawalas will not necessarily raise so many red flags
for investigators. First, hawaladars, even legitimate ones, might
not be willing to register as an MSB with FinCEN, or even know
about the federal regulations. Illegal hawaladars would have even
less incentive to register. One investigator, Alan Lambert, referred
to a former Clinton Treasury official's quote that, "even if you find
a hawala broker to interview, you'll be doing better than the
FBI."100
Second, irrespective of registration requirements, hawala trans-
actions create a minimal paper trail. Thus, even if investigators
were to penetrate a hawala operation, they would not necessarily
determine the brokers' senders and recipients.101
97 ld. at 10.
98 Id.
99 Nissman, supra note 30, at 18.
100 Lambert, supra note 4, at 18.
101 The U.S. General Accounting Office has observed that:
In one case, [the] Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") pursued drug
smugglers with suspected terrorist links who used hawala to transfer
their profits to Lebanon. However, the indecipherable records of the
hawala transactions to Lebanon impeded [the] DEA's ability to trace the
money once it reached Lebanon. As a result, [the] DEA was not able to
ascertain if the smugglers were providing material support to terrorists.
U.S. GEN. Acc. OFF., supra note 6, at 29.
20051
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Third, investigators rely upon financial institutions to file SARs
that focus attention on suspicious accounts used by hawala bro-
kers. If hawalas avoid these institutions altogether (by using alter-
nate means of balancing accounts) or do not generate enough activ-
ity to arouse suspicion, then no SARs will be filed. These factors
represent challenges for subsequent investigations. By being so
prominent and visible, Al Barakaat might have been low-lying
fruit. Illegal hawalas could prove harder to catch.
4.2. Foreign Law
Consider the laws and regulations of countries that substan-
tially use hawala to transfer funds. According to one observer, the
UAE (namely, its city-state of Dubai), India, and Pakistan "domi-
nate the world market." 102 According to Western intelligence
sources, these countries also "form[ ] the backbone of a system that
abets terrorism."103
Each country has had some success in subjecting the hawala
industry, as well as other financial systems, to government over-
sight. In some cases, they have even dismantled illegal hawala op-
erations. Nonetheless, since the laws and regulations rely primar-
ily upon detailed records, connections with mainstream financial
institutions, and government registration, hawala still presents a
challenge to investigators.
4.2.1. The United Arab Emirates
The UAE, a federation of seven city-states along the Persian
Gulf, has become a major financial center at the crossroads of the
Middle East. Approximately fifty banks operate there, as do about
eighty hawala brokers. 10 4 Indeed, the UAE might be the largest
clearinghouse for hawala transactions in the world.10 5
The UAE earned a reputation as a favored hub for terrorist
funding due to its lenient financial reporting requirements.
106
Banks and other financial institutions did not have to disclose cash
102 Ahmed, supra note 27.
103 O'Brien, supra note 68.
104 See id. (describing the hawala market in the UAE).
105 See Looney, supra note 26, at 165 (discussing hawala systems around the
world).
106 See Zachary Abuza, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Net-
work of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, 25 CoNTEmp. S.E. ASIA, No. 2, Aug. 1, 2003, at
170 (explaining hawala's role in financing terrorism).
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deposits. 07 U.S. officials have alleged that half of the financing for
the September 11th attacks (approximately $250,000) was wired
from banks in the UAE to al Qaeda operatives in the United
States. 08 American authorities have also alleged that banks in the
UAE transferred al Qaeda funds for the American Embassy bomb-
ings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.109
In January 2002, the UAE government introduced a money
laundering law that imposed disclosure requirements, such as "the
obligation for all cash movements of over $550 to be reported." 110
In late 2002, the UAE announced new laws and regulations to im-
pose greater restrictions and scrutiny on its financial system, in-
cluding hawala. Sultan al-Suwaidi, Governor of the Central Bank,
stated that hawaladars would be placed on a central registry."'
Also, limits were placed on "the percentage of paid-in capital a
bank can lend to a single individual or corporate entity." 112 These
reforms were conducted in accordance with directives from the
FATF.113 Notably, in 2002, the U.S. Customs Service opened offices
in the UAE, primarily as a base of operations for Operation Green
Quest, the same multi-agency financial task force that handled the
Al Barakaat investigation." 4
Bank officials in the UAE reported that from August 2001 to
May 2003, 429 reports of suspicious transactions were filed domes-
tically and sent abroad primarily to Canada, Switzerland, Britain,
the United States, Portugal, Italy, and Luxembourg.115 As of Octo-
ber 2003, those suspicious transactions had resulted in 46 active in-
vestigations in the UAE.116
The United States remains critical of the UAE's legal and regu-
107 Id.
108 O'Brien, supra note 68.
109 Id.
110 Jon Marks, UAE Strives To Be the Gulfs No. 1, BANKER, Sept. 2002, at 179.
111 Robin Allen, UAE to Tighten Rules for 'Terrorist' Cash System, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2002, at 12. As of October 18, 2003, the UAE government had issued sixty-
one certificates to hawala brokers and would soon issue twenty-two more certifi-
cates. UAE Defends Hawala System, UAE-The Official Web Site-News, Oct. 18,
2003, http://82.195.132.90/news/ default.asp?cntDisplay=50&ID=140.
112 Allen, supra note 111.
113 Id.
114 U.S. Customs UAE Offices Will Track Terror Money, J. COM., Jan. 29, 2003, at
WP, 2003 WLNR 1921179.
115 O'Brien, supra note 68.
116 Id.
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latory regime, and of its willingness to enforce those provisions.117
However, it is not clear that the existing laws and regulations
would be sufficient even if the authorities vigorously enforced
them. The laws of the UAE suffer from the same kinds of short-
comings that undermine U.S. laws on hawala. A reliance on regis-
tration and suspicious transaction reports blinds investigators to
hawala brokers that fail to register, operate with limited records,
and avoid the mainstream financial system.
4.2.2. Pakistan
Hawala is illegal, though quite popular, in Pakistan. 1 8 Indi-
vidual transactions have reached as high as $10 million." 9 At some
points, hawala was reportedly the country's largest source of hard
currency, an estimated $5 billion per year,120 though recent esti-
mates also have ranged from $2 billion to $3 billion per year.121
Pakistani government efforts to curb the use of hawala date
back many years. In the 1980s and 1990s, it used tax-exempt bearer
bonds to lure customers away from hawala businesses, and to at-
tract funds from Pakistani expatriates. 22 The country's test of a
nuclear weapon in 1998 prompted international condemnation and
doubts about the stability of Pakistan, thereby imperiling the bond
program.123 Under the Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restriction)
Act of 1998, foreign currency accounts were frozen. 24 Holders
could only withdraw funds in rupees at a government-set ex-
change rate.125 Faith in banks plunged and hawala's popularity
surged once again. 26 Foreign remittances through banking chan-
nels fell from $150 million to $50 million per month.127
In 2002, Pakistan enacted a law requiring hawala brokers to re-
117 Id.
118 JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2.
119 Miller, supra note 28, at 33.
120 Looney, supra note 26, at 166.
121 Ahmed, supra note 27, at A3.
122 PASSAS, supra note 19, at 63-64.
123 Miller, supra note 28, at 35.
124 Zulfiqar Ali, Govt Plans Law to Curb Money Laundering, DAWN, Mar. 25,
2003, available at http://www.dawn.com/2003/03/25/nat5.htm (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law).
125 Miller, supra note 28, at 32.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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cord their transfers and register with the government.128 Since
then, the government has shut down dozens of unregistered ha-
walas.129 In 2003, it established a Financial Intelligence Bureau,
which analyzes data on suspicious transactions and serves as a liai-
son with intelligence agencies, both foreign and domestic. 30 In
September 2003, U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow said that Paki-
stan had:
undertaken enormous strides to curb money laundering
.... Evidence of that is the strong action that has been
taken against money laundering and registration and regu-
lation of 'hawala' networks .... [A]lready the 'hawala' op-
erators and terrorist groups are switching over to using car-
riers and couriers to pass on cash across the international
borders.131
Pakistani initiatives to curb the illegal use of hawala, and un-
regulated hawala in general, have yielded some success. Govern-
ment officials have credited the crackdown on hawala with enlarg-
ing conventional financial channels.132 By June 2003, remittances
through conventional (and traceable) channels had risen from $2
billion to $4.2 billion in one year.133 Granted, hawala transfers still
reached an estimated $2 billion to $3 billion per year. 134 However,
these figures represent a $2 billion to $3 billion drop in hawala
transactions from a previous estimate of $5 billion per year.135
Other factors have also played a role in this reversal of hawala
use. As of January 2002, Pakistani hawaladars attributed some lost
business to the reporting requirements that closed off Dubai as a
128 Asad Cheema, Snow Lauds Pakistan's Efforts to Curb Terror, Money-
Laundering, THE DAILY MAIL, Sept. 20, 2003, available at http://dailymailnews.com
/200309/20/news/101.html (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal
of International Economic Law).
129 Id.
130 Mushtak Parker, Financial War on Terrorism Makes for Uneasy Alliance, THE
TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 2003, at 7.
131 M. Aftab, 'Hundi' Not Going for Good: Even Americans Know It, DAWN, Oct.
27, 2003, available at http://www.dawn.com/2003/10/27/ebr4.htm (on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law).
132 Ahmed, supra note 27.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Looney, supra note 26.
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"middleman" for transactions. 136 Also, at the behest of the gov-
ernment, foreign exchange companies, such as Western Union,
have begun to compete with hawala brokers.137 Finally, some ex-
perts suspect that the surge in transfers reflects the concerns of ex-
patriate Pakistanis about the safety of their money in the United
States. 138 In contrast, conventional remittances in India and the
UAE have only slightly increased, if at all.
139
Pakistan has successfully dismantled many illegal hawala bro-
kers and subjected the industry to government oversight. Even so,
its laws and regulations suffer from the same kinds of shortcom-
ings that undermine U.S. laws on hawala. The existing laws and
regulations on hawala might not be sufficient even if the authori-
ties vigorously enforce them. A reliance on registration and suspi-
cious transaction reports limits the effectiveness of investigators,
since some hawala brokers fail to register, operate with limited re-
cords, and avoid contact with the mainstream financial system.
4.2.3. India
Hawala is illegal, but very popular, in India.140 Using the latest
figures available, Interpol estimated that in 1998, the amount of
money in India's hawala system totaled $680 billion.'41 That
amounts to 40% of the country's GDP, but estimates have ranged
136 Naween Mangi, Pakistan Cripples the Money Movers, Bus. WK., Jan. 31, 2002,
at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf20020131_6995
.htm.
137 Mohiuddin Aazim, Money Changers Not Ready to Go After June 30, DAWN,
Oct. 12, 2003, available at http://www.dawn.com/2003/10/12/ebr3.htm (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law); see
also NBP Signs Deal with Western Union, DAWN, Jan. 24, 2003 (discussing the role of
Western Union in Pakistan), available at http://www.dawn.com/2003/01/24/
ebr5.htm (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Economic Law); Asif Asrar Usmani, Exchange Companies Ready to Replace Money
Changers, ECON. REV. (Pak.), Jan. 2003, at 9 (describing the role of foreign exchange
companies in Pakistan).
138 See Ahmed, supra note 27 (describing the other reasons for the rise in
mainstream financial transactions).
139 Id.
140 See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 1999-2000, supra note 7; Baldauf, supra note 22
(describing the popularity of hawala in India).
141 Baldauf, supra note 22.
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as high as 50%.142 Interviewees told one author that "hawala runs
the country."'1
43
Government programs to regulate hawala date back many
years. In the 1990s, the Indian government sought to curb hawala
use by liberalizing the economy through floating exchange rates
and relaxed gold restrictions.44 Professor Barry Rider remarked
that, "[n1o intelligence organization- except the Directorate of
Revenue Intelligence in India, perhaps-has ever effectively
cracked the system." 1
45
In March 1991, New Delhi police officers arrested two Kashmiri
militants who were connected to hawala transfers. 146 The subse-
quent investigation revealed a network of illegal funds totaling al-
most 650 million rupees (about $14 million).147 Thirty-eight cabinet
ministers (serving and former) were implicated, as were several
political parties.14 Under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
Act, the government held the suspects in jail for seven years with-
out trial.149 However, a court excluded a suspect's diary (which
contained coded transactions) from evidence, and the govern-
ment's case collapsed. 150
In 2003, India enacted the Prevention of Money-Laundering
Act, which requires hawala brokers to maintain detailed records
about their transactions.' 5 ' Strangely, the Indian law does not ex-
plicitly require the filing of suspicious transaction reports, in con-
142 Id.; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 1999-2000, supra note 7.
143 PASSAS, supra note 19, at 63.
144 Id.
145 Sarah Toyne and Jeremy Scott-Joynt, Following the Money Trail, BBC NEWS,
Nov. 7, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1553153.stm. For
details about the use of hawala in Indian political corruption, see KAPOOR, supra
note 54.
146 Lambert, supra note 4, at 17.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 India Code, The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act (Act No. 15 of 2003)
(India) available at http://indiacode.nic.in/rspaging.asp?tfnm=200315; Srinjay
Chakravarti, Business of Dirty Money, THE TELEGRAPH (Calcutta), Apr. 1, 2003,
available at http:/ /www.telegraphindia.com/1030401/asp/opinion/story-
1827091.asp. In contrast, under the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act
("FCRA") of 1976, hawala were not registered, and thus were not regulated.
Govt. Moots Plan to Curb Foreign Funds, THE STATESMAN (India), Oct. 4, 2001, 2001
WL 25976587.
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trast to U.S. law. 5 2 India also has a law called the Foreign Ex-
change Management Act, which regulates cross-border currency
transactions.153
India's money laundering law on hawala suffers from the same
kinds of shortcomings, and perhaps others, that undermine U.S.
laws on hawala. A reliance on financial records and registrations
hampers investigations, since some hawala brokers operate with
minimal records and limit their contact with the mainstream finan-
cial system. India's records-based legal regime suffers even more
so because of its failure to provide for suspicious transaction re-
ports.
4.3. International Law
The international community has supported the measures
adopted by the UAE, Pakistan, and India. As shown above, the
three countries have adopted hawala laws and regulations based
on registration, detailed recordkeeping, and suspicious transaction
reports. By lending its support to such measures, the international
community might have set the reform agenda in countries that
have not yet adopted hawala regulations. Some of these countries
will likely follow the lead set by India, Pakistan, and the UAE, and
adopt the records-based system for regulating hawala.
The FATF's Forty Recommendations, along with its eight Spe-
cial Recommendations, are the "international standards for com-
bating money laundering and the financing of terrorism."154 The
152 The Indian law states:
Provided that where the principal officer of a banking company or finan-
cial institution or intermediary, as the case may be, has reason to believe
that a single transaction or series of transactions integrally connected to
each other have been valued below the prescribed value so as to defeat
the provisions of this section, such officer shall furnish information in re-
spect of such transactions to the Director within the prescribed time.
INDIA CODE, The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, supra note 151, at § 12.
For additional information on the law, see Hema Ramakrishnan, Finmin May
Limit Reporting Under Money Laundering Act to Rs 10 lakh, ECONOMIC TIMES, Jan. 14,
2003, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/421304.cms.
153 INDIA CODE, The Foreign Exchange Management Act (Act No. 42 of 1999)
(India), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/rspaging.asp?tfnm=199942. For addi-
tional information on the law, see P. Jayaseelapandian, Understanding Money
Laundering, THE HINDU (India), Oct. 17, 2000, at AE-1.
154 FINANCIAL ACrION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 n.2 (2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ dataoecd/42/
43/33628117. PDF. In a report by the World Bank, Samuel Munzele Maimbo
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Forty Recommendations were originally drafted in 1990 in re-
sponse to the laundering of drug money. They have since evolved
to address money laundering in general, as well as terrorist financ-
ing.155
In October 2001, the FATF adopted eight "Special Recommen-
dations on Terrorist Financing." 156 One of them dealt specifically
with alternative remittance systems, which included hawala15 7 As
explained in interpretive notes released by the FATF, the recom-
mendation consists of three parts:
(A) Jurisdictions should require licensing or registration of
persons (natural or legal) that provide money/value trans-
fer services, including through informal systems; (B) Juris-
dictions should ensure that money/value transmission ser-
vices, including informal systems . . . are subject to
applicable FATF Forty Recommendations (in particular,
Recommendations 10-21 and 26-29) and the Eight Special
Recommendations (in particular SR VII); and (C) Jurisdic-
tions should be able to impose sanctions on money/value
transfer services, including informal systems, that operate
without a license or registration and that fail to comply
with relevant FATF Recommendations.
158
Sections A and C are straightforward. Section B requires more
explanation, since it cross-references Recommendations 10-21 and
26-29 (of the Forty Recommendations). 5 9 Significantly, those rec-
speculates upon regulatory frameworks for hawala. He offers a framework that
resembles the Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") approach. It also is based on
registration, record-keeping, and suspicious transaction reports. This approach
"render[s] business practices more transparent without sacrificing hawala's most
valuable attributes: cost-effectiveness, convenience, and regional reach." MAIMBO,
supra note 7, at 23.
155 Id. at 2.
156 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, SPECIAL RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING 1 (2001), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/55/16/34266142.pdf.
157 Id. at 2.
158 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, INTERPRETATIVE
NOTE TO SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION VI: ALTERNATIvE REMr-rANCE 1 (2001) (empha-
sis added), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/53/34/34262291.PDF.
159 Id.
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ommendations deal with record-keeping160 and suspicious transac-
tion reports, 161 among other measures. Section B also cross-
references "SR VII," Special Recommendation Seven. 62 According
to the interpretive notes, Special Recommendation Seven:
aims to ensure that basic information on the originator of
wire transfers is immediately available (1) to appropriate
law enforcement and/or prosecutorial authorities to assist
them in detecting, investigating, prosecuting terrorists or
other criminals and tracing the assets of terrorists or other
criminals, (2) to financial intelligence units for analysing
suspicious or unusual activity and disseminating it as nec-
essary, and (3) to beneficiary financial institutions to facili-
tate the identification and reporting of suspicious transac-
tions.163
As shown above, the Forty Recommendations and the eight
Special Recommendations by the FATF epitomize the records-
based system for hawala regulation. This system is characterized
by detailed recordkeeping, registration or licensing, and suspicious
transaction reports.
On May 16, 2002, the FATF's records-based approach garnered
considerable international support. In the "Abu Dhabi Declaration
on Hawala," the governments of almost forty countries agreed to
follow the FATF's Forty Recommendations and the eight Special
Recommendations, as well as other policies and principles. 64
160 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY RECOM-
MENDATIONS, supra note 154, at 4.
161 Id. at 5.
162 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, INTERPRETATIVE
NOTE TO SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION VI: ALTERNATVE REMITTANCE, supra note 158,
at 1.
163 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, INTERPRETATIVE
NOTE TO SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION VII: WIRE TRANSFERS 1 (2001), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/54/20/34263921.PDF.
164 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 15.
The Treasury Department states the following about the Abu Dhabi Declaration
on Hawala:
* Countries should adopt the 40 Recommendations of the Finan-
cial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering and the 8
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing in relation to
remitters, including Hawalas and other alternative remittance
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4.4. Summary of the Legal and Regulatory Regimes
This Comment has analyzed the hawala laws of the United
States, the UAE, Pakistan, and India, as well as the legal regime
proposed by the international community. These laws and pro-
posals follow a records-based approach and are characterized by
licensing or registration, detailed records, and suspicious transac-
tion reports.
However, hawala, by its very nature, poses a challenge to these
legal provisions. First, hawaladars, even legitimate ones, might not
be willing to register or obtain a license, assuming that they even
know about the law. Second, hawala transactions often generate a
vague paper trail that is incoherent to outsiders. Third, investiga-
tors rely upon financial institutions to file suspicious transaction
reports. If hawalas avoid these institutions altogether (by using al-
ternate means of balancing accounts) or do not generate sufficient
activity to arouse the suspicion of banking officials, then no reports
will be filed.
As shown, hawala poses significant challenges for investiga-
tors, some of which may be insurmountable. Even so, govern-
ments may take certain steps to mitigate these obstacles.
5. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES FOR CURTAILING ILLICIT HAWALA
Strategies for dealing with illicit hawala brokers fall into two
categories: 1) investigative techniques and 2) economic incentives
to encourage alternatives to hawala. In each case, developed states
and the international community should lend assistance to states
providers.
" Countries should designate competent supervisory authorities
to monitor and enforce the application of these recommenda-
tions to Hawalas and other alternative remittance providers.
* Regulations should be effective but not overly restrictive.
" The continued success in strengthening the international finan-
cial system and combating money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing requires the close support and unwavering commit-
ment of the international community.
* The international community should work individually and col-
lectively to regulate the Hawala System for legitimate com-
merce and to prevent its exploitation or misuse by criminals
and others.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAsuRY, supra note 78, at 16.
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(primarily developing states) that lack the skills or funds to curtail
illegal hawala.
It should be reiterated that the vast majority of customers use
hawala legitimately. In many cases, it represents the only afford-
able method for sending and receiving money; funds which often
fulfill basic needs. Without furnishing alternatives, eliminating the
hawala system or excessively encumbering it would deprive many
harmless people of a valuable service. Many of these people be-
long to ethnic communities with long cultural ties to hawala and
limited experience with other remittance systems. Governments
should be mindful of these factors as they investigate hawala and
promote alternatives. 65
5.1. Investigative Methods
The legal and regulatory regimes discussed in this Comment
use investigative methods that rely upon registration or licensing,
detailed records, and interactions with the mainstream financial
system. Accordingly, the success of investigations will depend on
how much hawala brokers engage in such actions. However, the
hawala system, by its very nature, often eschews these actions.
Vague paper trails, lack of registration, and limited interactions
with mainstream banking could doom some hawala investigations
to failure. Certain hawala brokers might successfully navigate the
intricacies of international commerce and remain undetected.
Nevertheless, other brokers, and their customers, will have to in-
teract with the mainstream financial system from time to time.
166
Patrick Jost, Product Development Manager of SRA International,
remarked:
Even though it is certainly possible for terrorists and other
criminals to move vast amounts of money into the United
States via Hawala with little or no trace, some of this money
is useless unless it can be converted to an acceptable form.
This necessitates a relationship between banks and hawala.
This relationship is a potential vulnerability in a hawala
money laundering or terrorist financing scheme, and this
165 See PASSAS, supra note 19, at 71 ("[Ilnvestigators must be trained to under-
stand the culture of ethnic groups they look into . .
166 Id. at 68.
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vulnerability should be exploited.' 67
Investigators may exploit these interactions to identify hawala
brokers using trends and patterns.168 First, the bank records of ha-
waladars tend to reflect significant deposit activity.169 Second,
these deposits usually come in the form of cash or checks from the
local ethnic customer base.170 Third, the checks might also list sec-
ondary account names, such as a foreign broker, or other notations,
such as the recipients of the funds. 171 Fourth, the bank accounts of
hawala brokers might also indicate outgoing wire transfers to fi-
nancial centers such as Great Britain, Switzerland, or Dubai 72
Though some states might lack these investigative skills, ex-
perienced states and the international community should lend their
efforts. In October 2002, FinCEN hosted a training conference on
informal banking systems in Oaxaca, Mexico. 173 Officials from the
United Kingdom, Pakistan, Bahrain, the International Monetary
Fund, and the World Bank offered advice to the attendees. 74
.5.2. Promoting Alternative Remittance Systems to Hawala
Another strategy focuses upon promoting financial alternatives
to hawala. This approach curtails illicit transactions by replacing
hawala with remittance systems that share its qualities but lack its
drawbacks. Alternatives could be just as fast, inexpensive, and re-
liable as hawala, but maintain detailed records and register with
the government.
By undermining hawala by promoting alternatives, govern-
ments could placate legitimate users of hawala, yet deprive money
167 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 48 (statement of Patrick Jost, SRA Inter-
national).
168 PASAS, supra note 19, at 69.
169 JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Financial War on Terrorism: New Money Trails Present Fresh Challenges: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong. 35 (2002) (statement of Jimmy Gu-
ruI, Under Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury), available
at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/84922.pdf.
174 An Assessment of the Tools Needed to Fight the Financing of Terrorism: Hearing
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of James Guru6,
Under Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3635.htm.
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launderers and terrorist financiers of a conduit for funds. The
FATF has observed that "[i]t follows logically, that the reduced
volumes of legal moneys using [informal remittance] systems
might make these systems less attractive as a cover for movements
of illegal funds."17 5
This strategy may be followed in tandem with the investigative
methods discussed earlier. This two-pronged approach would let
a government narrow its investigative focus to the remaining ha-
wala brokers that are not subject to oversight.
As this Comment has argued, hawala emerged in response to
certain economic conditions.1 76 In many countries, excessive gov-
ernment intervention in the economy has stunted the development
of mainstream financial institutions.' 77 Moreover, these financial
institutions cater mostly to governments and the wealthy. 78 Com-
pared to hawala, mainstream financial institutions cost more, 7 9
work more slowly, 180 and are unreliable.' 81 Until hawala faces wor-
thy competitors, it will remain popular.
Liberalization of the economy would help offset the conditions
that sustain hawala.182 This could be in the form of policies such as
lower taxes on remittances, floating currency rates, and the relaxa-
tion of currency regulations and interest rates.
183
Efforts to introduce alternatives to hawala may also be accom-
panied by initiatives to modernize a country's financial infrastruc-
ture. 84 This may come in the form of harmonization, the process of
altering a country's practices to conform to modern international
175 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON MONEY
LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 1999-2000, supra note 7, at 8.
176 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Tarik M. Yousef, Profes-
sor, Georgetown University).
177 PASSAS, supra note 19, at 70.
178 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Tarik M. Yousef, Profes-
sor, Georgetown University).
179 Ahmed, supra note 27.
180 JOST & SANDHU, supra note 2.
181 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of Patrick Jost, SRA Inter-
national). See MAMBO, supra note 7, at 39 (stressing that regulation alone will not
end hawala unless the need for a money transfer system is met).
182 PASSAS, supra note 19, at 70.
183 COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, FRAMEWORK FOR COMMONWEALTH PRINCI-
PLES ON PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND COMBATING CORRUPTION (1998),
available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared-asp-files/uploadedfiles/
%7BC628DA6C-4D83-4C5B-B6E8-FBA05F188C6%7D_frameworkl.pdf.
184 E1-Qorchi, supra note 42.
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standards. 185 These standards provide guidelines on international
capital flows, for instance.186 Such reforms could help improve
confidence in the mainstream banking system and draw customers
away from hawala. Though developing states might lack the
funds or skills to complete the harmonization process, developed
states and the international community should lend their efforts.
Assistance could be in the form of training and capacity building,
for instance.1
87
Governments and the private sector can promote mainstream
alternatives to hawala in a number of ways.188 The Indian gov-
ernment approved a partnership between Western Union and the
national postal service to operate in cities around the country.
189
Pakistan has enacted legislation that forces money changers to
convert to exchange companies by June 30, 2004.190 Moreover,
Western Union has partnered with Pakistan's state-run National
Bank to offer remittance services. 191 In Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
and the Persian Gulf states, exchange companies offer door-to-door
delivery, as do banks in the Philippines.192 These sorts of compa-
nies are "competing today with the hawala systems in speed, effi-
ciency of execution, settlement, and delivery of money and ser-
vices."193
6. CONCLUSION
The threat posed by illicit hawala might actually rise in the
coming years. As governments increasingly subject mainstream
financial institutions to oversight, criminal elements will likely
flock to the financial systems, such as hawala, that offer the most
185 Hawala testimony, supra note 6, at 34 (statement of Tarik M. Yousef, Profes-
sor, Georgetown University).
186 Id.
187 World Bank, Training and Capacity Building Activities, available at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/html/capacitybuilding-activities.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
188 For a list of some public and private sector programs to promote formal
remittance systems, see WORLD BANK, supra note 56, at 14-22.
189 Western Union, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, Jan. 15, 2004, 2004 WL 104818608.
190 Aazim, supra note 137.
191 Banks Mobilize Expatriate Pakistanis to Send Remittances, PAK. PRESS INT'L
INFO. SERV., Jan. 23, 2003, 2003 WL 5427176; NBP Signs Deal with Western Union,
supra note 137.
192 Looney, supra note 26.
193 Id.
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secrecy. 94
Since its transactions leave little or no trace, hawala will con-
tinue to challenge mainstream financial institutions and law en-
forcement officials. It might also force a reconsideration of existing
legal and regulatory regimes on money laundering and terrorist
financing. These regimes rely upon records and connections to
mainstream banking that some hawala brokers eschew.
As a result, hawala will remain a viable and attractive conduit
for money launderers and terrorist financiers. Even so, there are
opportunities on the margins for law enforcement. Governments
may exploit hawala's minimal connections with mainstream finan-
cial institutions and promote alternative remittance systems that
are subject to oversight.
194 Cottle, supra note 6.
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